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Abstract
We examine the transmission of financial shocks among three groups of countries: the Euro-
periphery countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain), the Euro-core countries (Germany,
France, the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium), and the major European Union -but not euro- coun-
tries (Sweden, UK, Poland, Czech Republic, Denmark). Using extreme returns on daily stock
market data from January 2004 till March 2013, we find that transmission effects are present for
the tails of the returns distributions for the Pre-crisis, the US-crisis and the Euro-crisis periods
from the Euro-periphery group to the Non-euro and the Euro-core groups. Within group effects
are stronger in the crisis periods. Even before the two crises there was a significant shock trans-
mission channel from the Euro-periphery to the Euro-core and the Non-euro. During the crises the
shocks transmitted were more substantial (in some cases, extreme bottom returns doubled). As
extreme returns have become much more ”extreme” during the financial crisis periods, the expected
losses on extreme return days have increased significantly. Given the fact that stock market capi-
talisations in these country groups are trillions of Euros, a 1% or 2% increase in extreme bottom
returns (in crisis periods) can lead to aggregate losses of tens of billions Euros in one single trading
day.
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1. Introduction
The recent global financial crisis began as a crisis of the subprime mortgage loans in the United
States of America in 2007 and continued with multiple waves of financial distress that hit the global
financial markets. Since the beginning of 2010 the Euro area faces a severe financial crisis. What
started off as a sovereign debt crisis from Greece soon transmitted to Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus and,
at least partially, to Spain and Italy. Pretty soon it became clear for Europe that beneath the sovereign
debt crisis surface there also existed a severe banking crisis. The propagation of financial distress from
one country to another, with stock markets, bond yields and CDS spreads being affected, makes the
case of studying the transmission of extreme returns more pertinent than ever1.
A number of researchers investigate the recent eurozone financial crisis and its transmission effects,
giving particular emphasis on the sovereign debt and the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) markets. Missio
and Watzka (2011) report the existence of contagion effects using dynamic conditional correlation
models. Metiu (2012) employs a simultaneous equations model and examines the tails of bond yield
distributions, an approach derived from the Extreme Value Theory and Value-at-Risk, and finds
structural shift contagion effects for the crisis periods. Other papers, however, do not find contagion
effects for the sovereign bond and the credit default swaps markets. See, for example, Caporin,
Pelizzon, Ravazzolo, and Rigobon (2013) and Bhanot, Burns, Hunter, and Williams (2012).
The study of stock markets during financial crises has not been examined sufficiently in the previous
literature despite them being the most liquid markets. In this paper we investigate the stock market
financial transmission effects of the european financial crisis (and the US-crisis) for three groups of
countries: two groups of eurozone countries, the Euro-core eurozone countries (Germany, France,
Netherlands, Belgium, Finland) and the Euro-periphery eurozone countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy,
Greece, Spain), and finally a group for European Union (EU) but not euro countries (Sweden, UK,
Poland, Czech Republic, Denmark). The creation of these three groups is justified mainly by the
existence of the European Union and the Eurozone. The European Union is primarily a trade union,
in which free movement of capital, labor and tradable goods take place. This has resulted in strong
ties which go well above these trade relationships, taking also the form of a primary political union
(with the existence of European Union legislation which applies to all member countries, the European
Parliament, and various political and administrative authorities such as the European Commission).
The Non-euro group is heterogeneous, but their participation in the European Union justifies grouping
these countries together. A subset of the European Union countries have formed the Eurozone which
on top of a trade union, is a monetary union as well, sharing Euro as a common currency. The heads
of state of the member countries of the Eurozone meet regularly in order to coordinate policy and
decision making. The agreed measures affect all Eurozone countries. This justifies the inclusion of the
Euro-core in our sample, which are the five countries with the highest market capitalisations among
all Eurozone countries. Finally, the five countries that were most badly hit from the recent crisis, are
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. These five countries are part of the European Union and
the Eurozone, which is why we group them together in the Euro-periphery group. The transmission
of shocks between the Euro-core and the Euro-periphery is interesting, because, being part of the
same trade union and the same monetary union, financial problems in one group may indeed also
1The shock transmission literature is extensive. See, for example Allen and Gale (2000), Rigobon (2002), Kaminsky,
Reinhart, and Vegh (2003), Pericoli and Sbracia (2003), Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005), Forbes and Rigobon (2001),
Aı¨t-Sahalia, Cacho-Diaz, and Laeven (2010), Dungey, Fry, Gonza´lez-Hermosillo, and Martin (2005), Corsetti, Pericoli,
and Sbracia (2005).
1
affect the other groups. The Euro-core countries were called upon to provide financial aid (along with
the other Eurozone countries, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund) to
the Euro-periphery countries that were in need. Since hundreds of billions Euros were provided as
assistance, it is worth examining the effect of extreme stock market shocks to the three country groups
for one more reason: the provision of financial assistance may not only have been a move of solidarity,
but also a move of self interest for the Euro-core and the Non-euro group, if this financial assistance
was able to mitigate the transmitted shocks2.
The correlations framework has been widely used by previous authors in related studies but there is
no consensus in the literature as to how to best define contagion when using that framework. Forbes
and Rigobon (2001) claim that heteroskedasticity biases correlation tests for contagion3. To avoid
this problem we follow the extreme returns approach proposed mainly in two papers, Bae, Karolyi,
and Stulz (2003) and Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2010). Bae et al. (2003) examine the coincidence of
extreme return shocks across countries within a group and across groups, while Boyson et al. (2010)
study hedge funds contagion. A number of other studies have also used this methodology4. Moving
in line with multinomial logistic analysis, as proposed by Bae et al. (2003) and Boyson et al. (2010),
we can use control variables (covariates) in order to justify the characteristics of extreme returns.
Furthermore, this approach allows us to study the effects within groups, and the crisis transmission
across groups. Since it is well accepted that the most vulnerable eurozone countries -the Euro-periphery
group- were the most badly hit by the Euro-crisis, our main interest is to study the crisis transmission
from the Euro-periphery group to the other two groups (Euro-periphery vs. Euro-core, Euro-periphery
vs. Non-euro)5,6. We find that extreme returns in Euro-periphery countries are related to extreme
returns in the Euro-core and the Non-euro country groups. In order to test if the crises result in
a fundamental shift in the transmission mechanism the extreme returns methodology is applied not
only on the entire period (as in previous studies), but also separately on each of the three subperiods
(Pre-crisis, US-crisis, Euro-crisis).
We find that even before the two crises there was a significant shock transmission channel from the
Euro-periphery to the Euro-core and the Non-euro groups. During the crises the shocks transmitted
were more substantial, not only for the Euro-periphery countries, but also for the Euro-core group and
the Non-euro group. Given the extremely big size of the European equity markets, a 1% or 2% increase
in the magnitude of extreme bottom returns can lead to aggregate losses of tens of billions Euros in
one single trading day, resulting in very important implications for investors and policy makers. The
differences in the models of the three periods are further verified by using likelihood ratio tests.
2Although the Non-euro countries did not directly contribute to the financial assistance packages, they are indirectly
affected through the IMF contributions. On top of that, decisions to create the European Financial Stability Facility
(EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in order to deal with the Euro-crisis were taken by all European
Union member states.
3By applying a correction they find no contagion for the 1997 Asian crisis. On the other hand, Corsetti et al. (2005)
claim that the variance restrictions imposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2001) are ”arbitrary and unrealistic”. They find
evidence for at least five countries facing contagion effects during the Hong Kong stock market crisis of 1997.
4See, for example, Markwat, Kole, and van Dijk (2009), Lucey and Sevic (2010), Christiansen and Ranaldo (2009),
Gropp, Duca, and Vesala (2009), Chouliaras and Grammatikos (2015)
5Another study that uses this approach is Thomadakis (2012), but our main difference is that he considers the
Eurozone countries as one group, thus not studying the within eurozone dynamics of the various subgroups, and he
studies the interactions mainly with the USA, for the industrials sectors of the stock exchanges.
6One critique on Bae et al. (2003) and Boyson et al. (2010) is that they arbitrarily pick the top and the bottom 5%
from the sample of returns to examine the joint occurrence of extreme returns. This critique has indeed some merit but
a choice of cutoff points is a necessary decision in order to proceed with this methodology and to study the tails of the
marginal return distributions in order to see what happens in the presence of extreme returns. The results of our study
were found to be robust in the change of the percentiles.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 presents
the basic model and we explain how we study the crisis transmission within and across groups. Section
4 provides a set of robustness and alternative specifications. Section 5 is a conclusion.
2. The Data
The main area of study for this paper is the European Union area. Thus, we create three country
groups: the Euro-periphery group contains the periphery eurozone countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy,
Greece, Spain), the Euro-core group contains the core countries of the Eurozone (Germany, France,
the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium), and the Non-euro group contains the major European Union (but
not Euro) countries (Poland, Sweden, Czech Republic, UK, Denmark)7. We examine the period from
01/01/2004 till 13/03/2013 using daily financial data obtained from the Thomson Reuters Datastream.
Our selection of countries for the Eurozone follows to a large extent the studies of Missio and Watzka
(2011), Caporin et al. (2013), Bhanot et al. (2012), and Metiu (2012). Country group log returns
(expressed in local currency) and standard deviations are calculated on the equally weighted portfolio
of the country stock market daily returns (expressed in local currency) for each group. Table 1 shows
the summary statistics and correlation matrices of the percentage returns of the major stock market
indices (Panel A and Panel B)8. To be able to make comparisons between normal and abnormal times
in the financial markets, we split our sample in three subperiods (Pre-crisis, US-crisis Euro-crisis):
• the Pre-crisis period (from 1 January 2004 till 26 February 2007)
• the US-crisis period (from 27 February 2007 till 7 December 2009).9
• the Euro-crisis period (from 8 December 2009 till the end of our sample period, 13 March 2013.
On 27 February 2007, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) announced that it
will no longer buy the most risky subprime mortgages and mortgage-related securities. On 8 December
2009, the Greek debt was downgraded by Fitch from A- to BBB+, with a negative outlook.
Insert Table 1 here
For the Pre-crisis period all groups of countries had positive mean returns, consistent with the
overall optimism in the financial markets. The best performing markets were firstly the Non-euro
countries (+0.101%) followed by the Euro-periphery countries (+0.089%). These numbers may appear
to be high (a mean of +0.101% per day leads to almost 25% per year), but one has to take into account
the rally that was observed in the stock markets during the Pre-crisis period. For example, the London
Stock Exchange index had a value of 273 in January 2004, and it climbed up to 1197 in February
2007, which means that in the end of the Pre-crisis period its price was almost four times higher than
the beginning of the Pre-crisis period. Regarding the standard deviation we see that we have rather
low values for all country groups as this was a period of relative calmness for the financial markets.
During the US-crisis period all country groups had a negative mean return. The Euro-periphery
countries were the most badly hit with a mean (daily) return of -0.074%, followed by the Euro-core
7We take the biggest five stock markets from each group using the market capitalisation ranking (as of 2011) from
http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD/rankings
8All stock indices used are the Thomson Reuters Datastream indices created for each country
9We use 27 February 2007 as the start of the financial crisis, as used by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in
their Timeline of Events and Policy Actions. The timeline can be found at http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.
cfm?p=timeline.
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countries which had a mean (daily) return of -0.049%, then the Non-euro with a -0.024%. Compared
to the Pre-crisis period, the standard deviations have increased significantly in the crisis periods for
all three country groups. The descriptive statistics for the Euro-crisis period show that once more the
Euro-periphery countries were the most severely affected from the financial crisis (mean daily return
of −0.016%). The other two groups have positive mean returns for this period, indicating that they
were able to better cope with the crisis. The standard deviations were lower than in the US-crisis
period but still higher than the Pre-crisis period, especially for the Euro-periphery group. As far as
the correlations are concerned the main remark is that they increased between the Pre-crisis and the
crisis periods. The correlation between the Non-euro and the Euro-periphery group grew from the
Pre-crisis value of 0.791 to 0.919 in the US-crisis period, then went down to 0.836 at the Euro-crisis
period. The correlation between the Euro-periphery and the Euro-core followed a similar pattern,
increasing from 0.870 Pre-crisis to 0.928 in the US-crisis, then declined to 0.876 in the Euro-crisis
period, still much higher than the Pre-crisis period. The correlation between the Non-euro and the
Euro-core group increased from 0.806 Pre-crisis to 0.912 in the US-crisis period, remaining at the
elevated level of 0.926 in the Euro-crisis. To summarize, for both crisis periods (US and Euro-crisis)
the correlations are higher than what they were in the Pre-crisis period, and the most hit group is
found to be the Euro-periphery group having negative mean returns in both crisis periods.
3. Extreme Returns
3.1. The Base Model
According to Bae et al. (2003) and Boyson et al. (2010), an extreme return is one that lies below
(or above) the lowest (or the highest) quantile of the marginal return distribution respectively. This
methodology concerns the counts of joint occurrences of extreme returns within a group on a particular
day. The original approach studies the extreme returns counts for the entire test period, taking as
thresholds for extreme returns the 5th and the 95th percentiles. In our case, and in order to have
a sufficient number of observations, we choose as thresholds the 10th and the 90th percentiles, as in
Boyson et al. (2010) (our findings are robust to the 5th and 95th percentiles). Thus, for each country
we consider returns below the 10th percentile as extreme bottom returns and those above the 90th
percentile as extreme top returns for this country.
This procedure is followed for all countries in all groups. Top extreme returns are treated separately
from bottom extreme returns. To demonstrate the application of the Bae et al. (2003) model, extreme
bottom and top counts are reported in Table 2, using the one cutoff for the overall sample. For each
country we calculate the days for which it had an extreme (bottom or top) return separately. Then,
the extreme returns count for each group and day is given as the sum of the extreme returns for all
countries that belong to that group for that specific day.
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Insert Table 2 here
The left side of Table 2 presents bottom return counts and the right side shows top return counts.
A count of i units for bottom returns is the joint occurrence of i extreme bottom returns on a particular
day for a specific group. By counting the total number of days with extreme returns of a given count
and identifying which countries participate in those events and how often we have a good overview of
the extreme returns for each country and group of countries.
We notice that out of the 10% lowest returns for all Euro-periphery countries the Greek stock
market had the most days (106) on which it was the only country experiencing a bottom extreme
return, followed by Ireland (56 days) and Portugal (37 days). A total of 54 days are reported for the
Euro-periphery countries on which all of them experienced extreme bottom returns. For the Euro-core
countries, 109 days are found that all five countries experienced an extreme bottom return shock. On
55 days all five Non-euro countries experienced bottom extreme returns, with the Czech Republic
having the most days (84) as the only country experiencing an extreme bottom return. On the other
hand, from the top 10% distribution, all Euro-periphery countries experienced an extreme top return
on 40 days. There are a total of 91 days on which five Euro-core countries experienced extreme top
returns. On a total of 28 days, all Non-euro countries had an extreme top return, with the Czech
Republic once more having the most days (95) with extreme top returns.
The graphical illustrations of bottom extreme return counts for the three groups appear in the
following Figure:
Insert Figure 1 here
It is obvious that extreme bottom returns have a much higher density in the crisis periods. What
we observe is a ”bottom extreme returns clustering”, since as one would expect most of the extreme
bottom returns fall within the crisis periods. This happens for all the three (3) groups of the fifteen
(15) European countries we study, and provides a visual confirmation of the quantitative result we
found as far as the intensification of extreme returns is concerned.
The methodology of Bae et al. (2003) can be applied to study two types of spill-over effects: within
groups and across groups. In this paper we mainly focus on effects across groups.
3.2. Examining the presence of extreme returns transmission
In order to capture the effects within a group we consider a polychotomous variable, like Bae
et al. (2003) and Boyson et al. (2010). In the theory of multinomial logistic regression models, if Pi is
the probability of an event category i out of m possible categories, a multinomial distribution can be
defined by
Pi = P (Yt = i|xj) = G(β
′
ixj)
1 +
∑m−1
j=1 G(β
′
jxj)
, (1)
where x is the vector of covariates and βi the vector of coefficients associated with the covariates.
The function G(β′ix) many times takes the form of an exponential function exp(β
′
ix), in which case
Equation 1 represents a multinomial logistic (or multinomial logit) model. Such models are estimated
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using maximum likelihood, with the log-likelihood function for a sample of n observations given by
logL =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
IijlogPij , (2)
where Iij is a binary variable that equals one if the ith observation falls in the jth category, and zero
otherwise. Goodness-of-fit is measured using the pseudo − R2 approach of McFadden (1974) where
the unrestricted (full model) likelihood, LΩ, and restricted (constants only) likelihood, Lω, functions
are compared:
pseudoR2 = 1− [logLω/logLΩ]. (3)
To capture the range of possible outcomes, and yet have a concrete model, we have a total of six
categories: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 extreme return counts. For a model that has only constants, m-1,
or five parameters, need to be estimated. But for every covariate added to the model, such as the
daily average exchange rate changes, five additional parameters need to be estimated, one for each
outcome. The top and the bottom extreme returns are estimated separately. Finally, we compute the
probability of a count of a specific level, Pi, by evaluating the covariates at their unconditional values,
P ∗ij =
exp(β′ix
∗
j )
1 +
∑m−1
j=1 exp(β
′
jx
∗
j )
, (4)
where xj∗ is the unconditional mean value of xj .
The coefficients that are given by a multinomial logistic regression compare the probability of a given
outcome with the base outcome (in our case the outcome 0 is the base outcome - i.e. the outcome
where no country has an extreme return). As mentioned in Greene (2003), the coefficients of such a
model are not easy to interpret. This is why it is necessary to differentiate 1 in order to obtain the
partial effects of the covariates on the probabilities
δij =
δPij
δβi
= Pij [xj −
J∑
k=0
Pikβk] = Pij [βj − β¯] (5)
where β¯ =
J∑
k=0
Pikβk, the weighted average of every subvector of β. In multinomial logistic regressions
the coefficients correspond to probabilities. Thus, these partial effects give us the marginal change in
probability for a unit change in the independent covariate. In such models we are interested in seeing
whether these marginal effects are statistically significant or not. These marginal effects may even
have different signs than the corresponding coefficients, since the derivative
δPij
βik
can have a different
sign than the coefficient βjk.
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10To elaborate a little further on why it is crucial that marginal effects are calculated for such models, it is known
that the coefficients of a multinomial logistic are obtained from comparing the probability of a given outcome with the
base outcome. In our case, the outcome is 0, in other words, no extreme returns in the group. Thus, the estimated
coefficient for covariate x13 for outcome 3, which is β13 and is the coefficient for the 1st covariate, calculated for the
3rd outcome, measures the probability of having an outcome equal to 3 (3 extreme returns in the group), instead of an
outcome 0 (no extreme returns in the group), for a unit change in the covariate x13. But in reality, there is also the
possibility of having the outcome 2 instead of 0 for a unit change in covariate x13. This is exactly why we need the
marginal effects, to calculate the probabilities associated with a unitary covariate change in adjacent categories, and not
taking as an alternative only the base outcome (0 in our study). This happens because the coefficients of a multinomial
logistic regression model exhibit what is known as the “log odds ratio” property:
ln
Pij
Pi0
= β′ixj (6)
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In our case, we have a variable Yt that counts the number of extreme returns and takes the value
i when extreme returns (top or bottom) occur for the same day in i stock market indices on day
t. This variable is calculated separately for the Euro-core, the Euro-periphery, and the Non-euro
groups. Then, in the multinomial logistic regression Equation 4 Pi is equal to P (Yt = i|xt) where
Yt = 0, 1, 2, ...k is the extreme return count variable that is created for the Non-euro, and for each
of the country groups we defined (Euro-periphery vs. Euro-core etc.). So, we have k=5 for all three
country groups, where xt is a vector of explanatory variables (covariates), on day t. In Equation 4,
the argument of the exponential part (representing the logistic function) is a function of the covariates
(xt) and the coefficients(the betas). This function is a linear expression of the arguments. Let’s call
it gi(t). We will use this function (which will take different forms) to study both the “within” and
“across” groups extreme returns effects.
3.3. Effects within groups
In this section, we study the three country groups to determine whether there exist effects within
them. Each of these groups has it’s own set of covariates. In line with Bae et al. (2003) and Gropp
et al. (2009), as independent variables incorporated in gi(t) we have the intercept, the conditional
volatility of the group stock index at time t (ht)
11, the average exchange rate change (per US dollars)
in the group (et), the average short term (ST) interest rate level in the group (it) as a proxy for
the interbank short term liquidity risk12, and the average long term (LT) spread change (bt) vis-a`-vis
Germany as a proxy for the sovereign risk change13.
We include exchange rate changes following Bae et al. (2003) who find that when currencies fall on
average (which means that eit rises) extreme returns are more common. Thus, the logistic regression
G(β′ix) = exp(gi(xt)) of equation 1 has the following form for gi(xt):
gi(xt) = b0i + b1iht + b2iet + b3iit + b4ibt (7)
where i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 for each country group, the extreme return count for the group. Equation 7
represents the inter-group effects formula for the three groups examined. For each group we calculate
the equally weighted average group values, on a daily basis, of the conditional volatility (ht), the
exchange rate change (et), the short term interest rates levels (it), and the long term spread change
vis-a`-vis Germany (bt).
We estimate these models for each group, for the entire sample and for each of the three time
periods. It is worth noting that, in the second case, the extreme return counts are calculated separately
for each of the three periods. In other words, in each of the three periods the bottom and top extreme
values correspond to the respective 10% and 90% threshold points of each period. For the entire
sample, we calculate the sum of the three subsamples (with three cutoffs). Otherwise, we would have
observations in the subsamples that might not be in the entire sample (or vice versa). As a robustness,
we also calculated the entire sample using one cutoff (see Section 4). We first present in Table 3 the
detailed findings for the Euro-periphery group for bottom extreme returns and for the entire period.
11The conditional volatility is estimated using an EGARCH(1,1) model to the equally-weighted group indexes.
12Short term interest rates are available in Datastream (3-month Interbank interest rates).
13Spreads are calculated as the difference between the yield of the 10 year government bond of country i’s debt and the
yield of the 10 year German government bond. Naturally, for the Euro-core group, one of the five countries is Germany,
so, for Germany, the LT Spread Change will be zero, but the other four Euro-core countries will have their respective
LT daily spread change.
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Insert Table 3 here
All the coefficients are the marginal effects, calculated as described in Equation 514. The probability
that no Euro-periphery country has a bottom tail return is equal to 77.49%. This is calculated as the
fraction of the number of 0 extreme returns divided by the total days 18592399 = 0.774. The coefficient
β01 corresponds to the event Y=1, in other words the event where only one Euro-periphery country
has an extreme return (an exceedance) on that day, and the probability of this event is calculated as
P1 =
exp(β01)
1+
5∑
i=0
exp(β0i)
. This probability is found to be equal to 12.3% (see baseline predicted probability of
Table 3, for column (1), i.e. for one bottom extreme return). If currencies in the group fall on average
(in which case eit rises), the probability of extreme returns increases, since the signs of the exchange
rate marginal effects are positive, and statistically significant at the 5% level for the first exceedance,
and at the 1% level for the coincidence of two, three, four and five bottom extreme returns. In their
study Bae et al. (2003) measured returns in dollars and the fact that they came up with very similar
results made them wonder whether the stock return contagion they measured was actually foreign
exchange contagion. Thus, they also estimated their models in local currencies, but the results were
similar to the dollar returns. But we estimate our models in local currencies from the beginning, so
we do not face such an issue. The results for ST interest rates are mixed since two marginal effects
are statistically significant, for the outcomes of one and five bottom counts in the group, but with
contradictory signs. Regarding the LT spread change in the group vis-a`-vis Germany, we find positive
and statistically significant marginal effects. For all extreme bottom outcomes except for the second,
the marginal effects are significant at the 1% level. The positive sign of the coefficient indicates that
a 1% increase in the average Euro-periphery LT spread increases the probability of extreme bottom
returns in the group. A change of 1% in the average LT spread of the Euro-periphery group, increases
the probability of two bottom extreme returns by 14.7%. To simplify the presentation, in Table 4 we
show a summary for the within groups results, for the entire sample, and the three periods separately.
The number of “+” (or “-”) indicates the number of statistically significant (in the 1% or 5% levels)
and positive (or negative) marginal effects.
Insert Table 4 here
Pre-crisis the effect of the covariates on the probability of extreme returns is rather weak, while
the role of covariates increases significantly in the crisis periods in most of the cases. The results are
even stronger when we take the extreme returns over the entire period which notably includes the
US-crisis as well. The effect of volatility is somehow smaller in the Euro-crisis period compared to
the Pre-crisis period, for the bottom tail. Exchange rate changes are not significant for the bottom
count of the Non-euro group in the Pre-crisis period, with zero significant marginal effects, while they
became significant in four of the five cases in the Euro-crisis period. Exchange rate changes have a
positive coefficient for the bottom tail, and a negative coefficient for the top tail. This means that
higher exchange rates (i.e. weaker currencies) lead to a higher probability of extreme bottom returns
and a lower probability of extreme top returns. Average ST interest rates are not significant in most
of the cases, while average LT spread changes become more significant in the Euro-crisis period, es-
14There are 23 more Tables like Table 3 (24 in total - 12 for bottom and 12 for top extreme returns. We do not include
them in this paper due to space constraints. These tables are available upon request.
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pecially for the Euro-core and the Euro-periphery group as far as the bottom tails are concerned, and
the Non-euro and Euro-core groups for the top tail returns. For the bottom tail, higher average group
LT spread changes (i.e. an increase in the average group sovereign risk) lead to higher probabilities
of extreme group bottom returns, while they decrease the probability of extreme top returns.
In summary, the findings so far indicate a much tighter relationship of the fundamental factors
(covariates) affecting the extreme stock market movements within each group during the Euro-crisis
and US-crisis periods compared to the Pre-crisis period.
3.4. Effects across groups
Next we test for across groups effects. This deals with the question of whether the number of
extreme return counts in one group (the Euro-periphery group) can help predict the number of extreme
returns in other groups (the Euro-core and the Non-euro groups). According to Bae et al. (2003) and
Boyson et al. (2010), if a fraction of extreme returns in one group is unexplained by its own covariates,
but can be explained by extreme returns in another area, this can be interpreted as evidence of
transmission of the crisis across groups15.
Our primary interest is to study for across-groups effects from the Euro-periphery group to the
Non-euro and the Euro-core groups. To examine this question, we reestimate the models of Table 4
for the Euro-core and Non-euro groups respectively, adding a covariate related to the extreme return
count (Y ∗jt) from the Euro-periphery. In this case the equations for the across groups examination take
the following shape:
gi(xt) = b0 + b1hit + b2eit + b3iit + b4bit + b5Y
∗
jt (8)
For example, to examine if the Euro-periphery group provokes transmission effects in the Euro-core
group the dependent variable is the number of extreme returns in the Euro-core group and the first
three covariates of the right hand side concern the Euro-core group, while the last covariate is related
to the count of extreme returns of the Euro-periphery group on that day. The null hypothesis of no
transmission effects can be rejected in case the coefficient of Y ∗jt is found to be statistically significant.
In Table 5 we present the detailed across groups effects from the Euro-periphery extreme bottom
returns to the Euro-core group for the entire period:
Insert Table 5 here
The main variable of interest is the ”Bottom Count Euro-periphery” variable, which is the Y ∗jt in
equation 8. We see that this variable is positive and significant for all five Euro-core bottom outcomes.
In other words a higher value of bottom Euro-periphery extreme returns increases the probability of
bottom extreme returns for the Euro-core group as well. For one more Euro-periphery country having
extreme bottom returns, there is an increase of 7.8% in the probability of one Euro-core country
having extreme bottom returns. Given the fact that the baseline predicted probability of one Euro-
core country having an extreme bottom return is 6.9%, this marginal effect is very significant both
15In general, the definition of contagion is far from being simple and commonly accepted. Pericoli and Sbracia (2003)
provide five of the most widely accepted definitions of financial contagion. According to one of their definitions “Contagion
is a significant increase in the probability of a crisis in one country, conditional on a crisis occurring in another country.”.
According to another of their definitions, “Contagion occurs when cross-country comovements of asset prices cannot be
explained by fundamentals”. Hence, these definitions are consistent with Bae et al. (2003) and Boyson et al. (2010).
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economically and statistically.
Table 6 reports the marginal effects of Y ∗jt for all five extreme outcomes, for all groups and all
periods:
Insert Table 6 here
The gray line corresponds to the gray line in Table 5. Indeed we see that the statistical significance of
Y ∗jt is very strong and quite stable throughout the Entire period and the three subperiods (Pre-crisis,
US-crisis and Euro-crisis). The marginal effects are quite significant, with one more Euro-periphery
country having extreme bottom returns increasing by 9.8% the probability of one Non-euro country
having extreme bottom returns in the Entire period, 10.5% in the Pre-crisis period, 10.5% in the
US-crisis period and 6.4% in the Euro-crisis period. In some cases the coefficients intensify during
the US-crisis: a 4.8% increase for two (2) Non-euro bottom extreme returns in the Pre-crisis period
becomes 6.3% in the US-crisis, an 8.5% increase for the one (1) Euro-core bottom extreme return
becomes 11% during the US-crisis et cetera. We notice that the marginal effects are sometimes lower
in the Euro-crisis period (6.4% instead of 10.5%, 3.6% instead of 6.3%, 1.3% instead of 2.6% for the
Non-euro group for the outcomes of one, two and three bottom extreme returns). But one has to take
into account that an extreme return is much more ”extreme” during the Euro-crisis period compared
to the Pre-crisis period, in terms of the magnitude of expected losses. We further discuss this later in
this section.
Table 7 provides the summary results for the across groups effects, for the entire period and the
three time periods we examine (the Pre-crisis, the US-crisis and the Euro-crisis periods) separately.
Insert Table 7 here
The evidence supports the hypothesis that there exist important (positive) effects from the Euro-
periphery to the other two groups. Extreme bottom (or top) return counts in the Euro-periphery group
have a significant (and positive) impact on the extreme return counts of the Euro-core and Non-euro
groups in most of the cases. The results are stronger for the entire sample period (which also includes
the US-crisis) but the number of statistically significant coefficients does not change between the Pre-
crisis and the crisis periods. Counting the number of statistically significant parameters provides an
indication of the evolving dynamics of the transmission of extreme shocks from the Euro-periphery
to the Non-euro and the Euro-core groups, but, to add rigor on top of this approach, we estimate
the parameters on the three subsamples together, and then conduct likelihood ratio tests to see
whether separate parameters for the subsamples are needed. The null hypothesis is that models under
examination are nested to each other, which means that estimating separate parameters does not
create a statistically significant improvement in the fit of the model. The null hypothesis is rejected
in a statistical significance level α if:
Reject H0 if: P-value < α (9)
In case the null hypothesis is rejected, the two models are not nested, which means that statistically
significant differences exist between the examined subperiods. The results of the likelihood ratio tests
appear in Table 8:
10
Insert Table 8 here
The likelihood ratio test results of Tables 8 indeed confirm significant statistical differences of
the relationships affecting bottom extreme returns count for almost all periods. We are testing all
possible four (4) assumptions: 1) that the Pre-crisis, US-crisis and Euro-crisis models are nested in
the Entire model, that the Pre-crisis and US-crisis period models are nested in the combined Pre-crisis
and US-crisis models, that the US-crisis and Euro-crisis period models are nested in the combined
US-crisis and Euro-crisis model, and that the Pre-crisis and Euro-crisis period models are nested in
the combined Pre-crisis and Euro-crisis models. Since we are studying the across group effects on two
groups (Euro-core and Non-euro), we have in total eight (8) different model specifications to compare.
Interestingly, out of these eight (8) specifications, two models appear to not have significantly changed
(at the 1% level): those comparing the individual US-crisis and Euro-crisis models to the combined
US-crisis and Euro-crisis model. Therefore, the evidence is strong that the relationships affecting
bottom extreme returns have indeed changed during the two crises periods compared to the before
crisis period, but may have been similar between the two crises. Moreover, the absolute size of the
effects is stronger since the same 10% cutoff values are higher during the crisis periods, as Table 9
shows:
Insert Table 9 here
In other words, even before the two crises there was a significant shock transmission channel from
the Euro-periphery to the Euro-core and the Non-euro, but the shocks became deeper in terms of the
expected losses for all groups, indicating an intensification of the effects in terms of the actual stock
market losses they incur. Studying only the coefficients of the extreme returns during the three periods
can be misleading in the sense that the underlying extreme returns are sometimes significant higher
in the crisis periods, which means the expected losses are significantly higher, a fact that should not
be neglected. This is also verified by the average returns on the days with extreme bottom outcomes
which appear on Table 10:
Insert Table 10 here
Indeed, one can easily compare the Pre-crisis with the crisis periods and see the evident intensifi-
cation of extreme bottom returns. For example, the average return on days where four (4) Non-euro
country had an extreme bottom return (column 4) is -1.694% in the Pre-crisis period, while it de-
creases to -3.346% in the US-crisis and to -2.565% in the Euro-crisis period. For the outcome where
all five (5) Euro-core countries had an extreme bottom return on the same day (column 5) the av-
erage return decreased from -1.776% in the Pre-crisis to -4.236% in the US-crisis and to -2.802% in
the Euro-crisis period. Thus, an ”extreme bottom return” in the Euro-crisis period, is much more
intense than an ”extreme bottom return” in the Pre-crisis period. Although the percentile does not
change (10% of the marginal distribution in both periods), the actual returns themselves are much
more negative. This results in higher expected losses for investors in the occurrence of an ”extreme
event” (which by definition happens in 10% of the days for all countries). Given the fact that stock
market capitalisations in these country groups are trillions of Euros, a 1% or 2% increase in extreme
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bottom returns (in crisis periods) can lead to aggregate losses of tens of billions Euros in one single
trading day.
4. Robustness and alternative specifications
To verify the robustness of our results, as a first robustness check, instead of 10% and 90% ex-
treme returns cutoffs, we used the 5% and 95% percentages. The results are robust in this change.
Furthermore as a second robustness check, instead of the raw returns, we calculated extreme returns
on the standardized residuals of a GARCH(1,1) model, accounting for the time-varying volatility ef-
fects, since in periods of high volatility, extreme returns are more probable. In order to calculate the
volatility, we move in line with Christiansen and Ranaldo (2009), estimating a AR(1)-GARCH(1,1)
model for each group’s average returns:
Retgroupt = c0 + c1Ret
group
t−1 + t (10)
where t N(0, σ
2
t ) and the variance follows a GARCH(1,1) process:
σ2t = c2 + c3σ
2
t−1 + c4
2
t−1 (11)
The volatilities are then obtained as the estimated σˆt from the AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model. We notice
that for the extreme returns counts filtered by a GARCH the effect of volatility is not significant (for
the raw returns all volatility coefficients were found to be positive and statistically significant - in
other words an increase in volatility increases the probability of extreme bottom returns).
As a final robustness check, we re-estimated the models for the Entire period, using one cutoff, instead
of separate cutoffs for the subperiods.
The results are found to be robust when compared with the results of the three cutoffs previously
examined.16
5. Conclusion
We examine the transmission of financial shocks among three groups of countries: the Euro-
periphery countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain), the Euro-core countries (Germany,
France, the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium), and the major European Union -but not euro- coun-
tries (Sweden, UK, Poland, Czech Republic, Denmark), using daily stock market data from Jan-
uary 2004 till March 2013. The entire period is further split in three sub periods, the Pre-crisis
period (1/1/2004-26/2/2007), the US-crisis period (27/2/2007-7/12/2009) and the Euro-crisis period
(8/12/2009-13/3/2013). The creation of the three groups is justified by the existence of the European
Union (which is mainly a trade union), and the Eurozone (monetary union). The five Euro-periphery
countries were the most badly hit during the recent crises periods, Our analysis is split in two parts:
the first part concerns extreme stock index returns, controlling for various fundamentals derived from
financial market data (volatility, exchange rate change, short interest rates, long term spread change).
We find that even before the two crises periods there was a significant shock transmission channel
from the Euro-periphery to the Euro-core and the Non-euro groups. During the crises the shocks
transmitted were more substantial. Thus, expected losses from extreme returns have increased in the
16The results are available upon request.
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crises periods, being evidence of an intensification of the effects during the recent financial crises. The
fact that indeed the models in the different periods exhibit differences is verified using likelihood ratio
tests.
The implications of the overall findings are quite significant for investors who may want to diver-
sify their portfolios and should be aware of the stock indices movement dynamics and of how extreme
shocks propagate from one group of countries to the others, affecting their portfolios’ overall risk.
Furthermore, the findings would be useful for policy makers in order to assess policy decision making
in times of extreme shocks (such as crisis periods). The fact that the European financial markets are
affecting one another provides evidence that in case that crisis episodes are not properly confronted,
extreme returns may propagate and cluster, leading to significant losses for investors and institutions.
Future research could also take into effect different models or move in the direction of higher frequency
(intraday) financial markets dynamics.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Stock Indices
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Pre-crisis US-crisis Euro-crisis
1/1/2004 - 26/2/2007 27/2/2007 - 7/12/2009 8/12/2009 - 13/3/2013
Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core
Mean (%) 0.101 0.089 0.081 −0.024 −0.074 −0.049 0.030 −0.016 0.030
Median (%) 0.142 0.104 0.108 0.013 0.008 0.013 0.0544 0.015 0.052
Std. Dev. (%) 0.715 0.569 0.703 1.616 1.555 1.619 0.952 1.284 1.189
Minimum (%) −4.514 −3.405 −3.338 −8.809 −8.118 −7.618 −4.467 −4.929 −5.081
Maximum (%) 3.441 2.790 2.858 8.689 7.838 8.584 5.321 9.118 6.848
Panel B: Correlations
Pre-crisis US-crisis Euro-crisis
1/1/2004 - 26/2/2007 27/2/2007 - 7/12/2009 8/12/2009 - 13/3/2013
Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core
Non-euro 1.000 1.000 1.000
Euro-periphery 0.791 1.000 0.919 1.000 0.836 1.000
Euro-core 0.806 0.870 1.000 0.912 0.928 1.000 0.926 0.876 1.000
Note: European countries are split in three groups: the Euro-periphery countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain), the Euro-core countries
(Germany, France, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium) and the European Union -non Euro- countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Sweden, UK, Denmark).
Country group log returns and standard deviations are calculated on the equally weighted mean portfolio of the country stock market daily returns for
each group.
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Table 2: Counts of extreme bottom (and top) log returns for daily country group stock indices, January
1st 2004 to March 13th 2013.
Mean return (%)
when i = 5
Number of bottom counts Number of top counts Mean return (%)
when i = 5
5 4 3 2 1 0 0 1 2 3 4 5
Non-euro
POL −3.446 55 41 38 49 57 1847 1783 82 47 40 43 28 3.653
SWE −3.727 55 45 54 54 32 1847 1783 42 56 61 53 28 4.025
CZE −3.828 55 27 28 46 84 1847 1783 95 57 31 29 28 4.022
UK −3.241 55 52 60 43 30 1847 1783 37 56 62 57 28 3.572
DEN −3.370 55 47 48 42 48 1847 1783 61 42 55 54 28 3.382
Subtotal 55 53 76 117 251 1847 1783 317 129 83 59 28
Euro-
periphery
POR −3.253 54 66 44 39 37 1859 1817 61 45 34 60 40 3.008
IRE −3.944 54 54 26 50 56 1859 1817 69 47 31 53 40 3.522
ITA −3.636 54 69 45 52 20 1859 1817 20 62 56 62 40 3.678
GRE −4.160 54 35 22 23 106 1859 1817 108 32 20 40 40 4.200
SPA −3.503 54 64 49 44 29 1859 1817 29 56 54 61 40 3.652
Subtotal 54 72 62 104 248 1859 1817 287 121 65 69 40
Euro-core
GER −2.855 109 44 32 19 36 1970 1938 46 25 31 47 91 2.530
FRA −3.137 109 56 46 19 10 1970 1938 13 35 41 60 91 2.842
NL −3.169 109 51 37 22 21 1970 1938 20 27 50 52 91 2.782
FIN −3.303 109 38 24 19 50 1970 1938 48 26 26 49 91 3.240
BEL −2.809 109 35 32 27 37 1970 1938 51 29 29 40 91 2.534
Subtotal 109 56 57 53 154 1970 1938 178 71 59 62 91
Note: Extreme returns for daily stock index top (bottom) log returns are the ones belonging to the
highest (lowest) 10% of all daily returns. The extreme counts are defined as the joint occurrence of
extreme returns across different country indexes on the same day. For example, out of a total sample
of 2399 trading days, there are 104 days where exactly two Euro-periphery countries had extreme
bottom returns on the same day, and in 23 of those days Greece is the one of the two countries having
extreme bottom returns.
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Table 3: Within the Euro-periphery group bottom extreme counts of log returns for the entire period.
The bottom extreme counts for the entire period are calculated as the sum of the bottom extreme
counts for the three subperiods. All reported coefficients are marginal effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Margin / SE Margin / SE Margin / SE Margin / SE Margin / SE
Constant −0.157∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Volatility 0.014 0.006 0.008∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Exchange Rate Change 0.043∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
ST Interest Rate −0.009∗ 0.001 0.002 −0.001 0.004∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
LT Spread Change 0.065 0.147∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.034) (0.023) (0.018) (0.016)
Observations 2399 2399 2399 2399 2399
Baseline predicted probability 0.123 0.043 0.029 0.024 0.022
Pseudo−R2 0.063
Note: Columns (1) to (5) correspond to bottom extreme counts 1 to 5. In other words, column (1)
presents the marginal effects in the case of one bottom count for the Euro-periphery group, and
columns (2),(3),(4),(5) correspond to two, three, four and five bottom counts for this group. The value
of 0.147 for the Euro-periphery LT spread changes (column 2) means that an increase of 1 percent
in the average Euro-periphery long term spread (vis-a`-vis Germany) increases the probability of two
Euro-periphery countries having extreme bottom stock returns by 14.7%, while the value of 0.043
for the average exchange rate change (column 1) means that a one percent increase in the average
Euro-periphery exchange rate increases the probability of one bottom Euro-periphery extreme return
by 4.3%.
(***) : significance at 1% level
(**) : significance at 5% level
(*) : significance at 10% level
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Table 4: Within groups summary results for bottom and top extreme return counts.
Bottom tail Top tail
Entire Period
Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core
Volatility + + ++ + + + + + + + + ++ + + ++ + + ++
Exchange Rate Ch. + + + + + + + + + + + + + −−−−− −−−−− −−−−
ST Interest Rate −+ + −− − −−
LT Spread Change + + + + + + + ++ + + + −−−−− −−−−− −−−
Pseudo−R2 0.081 0.063 0.052 0.086 0.049 0.052
Pre-crisis Period
Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core
Volatility + + + + + + ++ + + + + ++
Exchange Rate Ch. − − + +
ST Interest Rate −− − +
LT Spread Change + + −
Pseudo−R2 0.040 0.039 0.036 0.044 0.016 0.038
US-crisis Period
Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core
Volatility + + + + + ++ + + ++ + + ++ + + ++ + + + + +
Exchange Rate Ch. + + + + + ++ + −−−− − −−
ST Interest Rate −− − −−
LT Spread Change + ++ − −−
Pseudo−R2 0.122 0.085 0.084 0.137 0.084 0.079
Euro-crisis Period
Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core
Volatility + ++ ++ + + ++ − + + ++
Exchange Rate Ch. + + ++ + + ++ + + + −−−− −−−− −−
ST Interest Rate +
LT Spread Change + + + + + + ++ −−−− − −−−−
Pseudo−R2 0.194 0.176 0.181 0.172 0.119 0.167
Note: The number of “+” (or “-”) indicate the number of statistically significant (in the 1% or
5% levels) and positive (or negative) marginal effects. For example, for the bottom tail returns
and the entire period sample, all five volatility marginal effects are significant and positive for the
Non-euro group (this is why we have five plus symbols at the Non-euro column), indicating that an
increase in volatility increases the probability of extreme bottom returns in all five bottom extreme
outcomes. For the top tail returns, the number of statistically significant marginal effects are five for
the average exchange rate change in the Non-euro group, meaning that an increase in the average
group’s exchange rates (i.e. weaker group currencies on average) leads to lower probabilities of top
Non-euro counts (for all five possible outcomes).
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Table 5: Across groups effects: Euro-periphery to Euro-core bottom extreme returns for the entire
period. All reported coefficients are marginal effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Margin / SE Margin / SE Margin / SE Margin / SE Margin / SE
Constant −0.228∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.005)
Volatility 0.007 0.007 0.007∗∗ 0.003 0.002∗∗
(0.012) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Exchange Rate Change −0.006 −0.002 0.002 −0.001 0.000
(0.010) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000)
ST Interest Rate 0.009∗∗ 0.002 0.001 −0.000 −0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
LT Spread Change 0.847∗∗∗ 0.115 0.044 0.056 0.013
(0.285) (0.157) (0.077) (0.044) (0.011)
Bottom Count Euro-periphery 0.078∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 2399 2399 2399 2399 2399
Baseline predicted probability 0.069 0.030 0.023 0.020 0.045
Pseudo−R2 0.318
Note: Columns (1) to (5) correspond to bottom counts 1 to 5. In other words, column (1) presents
the marginal effects in the case of one bottom count for the Euro-periphery group, and columns
(2),(3),(4),(5) correspond to two, three, four and five bottom counts for this group. The value of
0.78 for the Euro-peripheryc bottom count (column 1) means that an increase of 1 Euro-periphery
countries having extreme bottom returns increases the probability of one Euro-core country having
extreme bottom stock returns (i.e. one bottom Euro-core count) by 7.8%. The gray line corresponds
to the gray line in Table 6.
(***) : significance at 1% level
(**) : significance at 5% level
(*) : significance at 10% level
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Table 6: Across groups effects: Euro-periphery to all groups for all periods. All reported coefficients are marginal effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Margin / SE Margin / SE Margin / SE Margin / SE Margin / SE Pseudo−R2
Entire Period
To Non-euro (Bottom) 0.098∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.000 0.258
To Euro-core (Bottom) 0.078∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.318
To Non-euro (Top) 0.099∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.000 0.218
To Euro-core (Top) 0.094∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.345
Pre-crisis Period
To Non-euro (Bottom) 0.105∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.000 0.223
To Euro-core (Bottom) 0.085∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.003 0.281
To Non-euro (Top) 0.104∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.001 0.000 0.159
To Euro-core (Top) 0.092∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.002 0.246
US-crisis Period
To Non-euro (Bottom) 0.105∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.004 0.000∗∗∗ 0.341
To Euro-core (Bottom) 0.110∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.001 0.383
To Non-euro (Top) 0.092∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.000 0.316
To Euro-core (Top) 0.102∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.004 0.345
Euro-crisis Period
To Non-euro (Bottom) 0.064∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.002 0.000 0.290
To Euro-core (Bottom) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.004 0.373
To Non-euro (Top) 0.042∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.002 0.000 0.262
To Euro-core (Top) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.343
Note: Columns (1) to (5) correspond to bottom counts 1 to 5. In other words, column (1) presents the marginal effects in the case of one bottom count
for the Euro-periphery group, and columns (2),(3),(4),(5) correspond to two, three, four and five bottom counts for this group. The value of 0.78 for the
Euro-periphery bottom count (column 1) means that an increase of 1 in the number of Euro-periphery countries having extreme bottom returns increases
the probability of one Euro-core country having extreme bottom stock returns (i.e. one bottom Euro-core count) by 7.8% for the Entire period, 8.5% in
the Pre-crisis period, 11.0% in the US-crisis period and 4.4% in the Euro-crisis period. The gray line corresponds to the gray line in Table 5.
(***) : significance at 1% level
(**) : significance at 5% level
(*) : significance at 10% level
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Table 7: Across groups summary results for bottom and top extreme counts.
Bottom tail Top tail
Entire Period
Non-euro Euro-core Non-euro Euro-core
(from Euro-periphery)
Volatility + + + ++ + + + + + + + +
Exchange Rate Change + + ++ −−−−
ST Interest Rate + + + ++ +
LT Spread Change + + −−− −
Euro-periphery Bottom Extreme Count + + + + + + + + + + + + ++ + + + + +
Pseudo−R2 0.257 0.318 0.218 0.291
Pre-crisis Period
Non-euro Euro-core Non-euro Euro-core
(from Euro-periphery)
Volatility ++ ++
Exchange Rate Change − +
ST Interest Rate −
LT Spread Change −
Euro-periphery Bottom Extreme Count + + + + + ++ + + + + + ++
Pseudo−R2 0.223 0.281 0.159 0.245
US-crisis Period
Non-euro Euro-core Non-euro Euro-core
(from Euro-periphery)
Volatility ++ ++ + + + + + ++
Exchange Rate Change + + + −−− −
ST Interest Rate − −
LT Spread Change +
Euro-periphery Bottom Extreme Count + + ++ + + ++ + + ++ + + ++
Pseudo−R2 0.341 0.384 0.345
Euro-crisis Period
Non-euro Euro-core Non-euro Euro-core
(from Euro-periphery)
Volatility + + + + + +
Exchange Rate Change + + + −−−
ST Interest Rate +
LT Spread Change + − −−
Euro-periphery Bottom Extreme Count + + + + + ++ + + + + + ++
Pseudo−R2 0.290 0.373 0.262 0.342
Note: The number of “+” (or “-”) indicate the number of statistically significant (in the 1% or 5%
levels) and positive (or negative) marginal effects. For example, for the bottom tail returns and the
entire period sample, three out of five volatility marginal effects are significant and positive for the
Non-euro group, indicating that an increase in volatility increases the probability of bottom Non-euro
extreme counts in three out of five outcomes. For the top tail returns, the number of statistically
significant marginal effects are four for the average exchange rate change, and have a negative sign
in all four cases, meaning that an increase in the average group’s exchange rates (i.e. weaker group
currencies on average) lead to lower probabilities of extreme top returns in four out of five top Non-euro
outcomes.
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Table 8: Likelihood ratio tests.
Euro-periphery to Euro-core
Model Obs df Prob > chi2
Nested Entire period 2399 30 0.000
Non-nested Pre-crisis 822 30
US-crisis 725 30
Euro-crisis 852 30
Nested Pre-crisis, US-crisis 1547 30 0.0077
Non-nested Pre-crisis 822 30
US-crisis 725 30
Nested US-crisis, Euro-crisis 1577 30 0.0128
Non-nested US-crisis 725 30
Euro-crisis 852 30
Nested Pre-crisis, Euro-crisis 1674 30 0.0077
Non-nested Pre-crisis 822 30
Euro-crisis 852 30
Euro-periphery to Non-euro
Model Obs df Prob > chi2
Nested Entire period 2399 30 0.000
Non-nested Pre-crisis 822 30
US-crisis 725 30
Euro-crisis 852 30
Nested Pre-crisis, US-crisis 1547 30 0.000
Non-nested Pre-crisis 822 30
US-crisis 725 30
Nested US-crisis, Euro-crisis 725 30 1.0000
Non-nested US-crisis 725 30
Euro-crisis 852 30
Nested Pre-crisis, Euro-crisis 1674 30 0.0010
Non-nested Pre-crisis 822 30
Euro-crisis 852 30
Note: Likelihood ratio tests for the Entire Period, the Pre-crisis Period, the US-crisis Period and the
Euro-crisis Period models. Obs denotes the number of observations for each model, df is the number
of degrees of freedom.
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Table 9: 10% percentiles for the extreme bottom returns (%) of the three country-groups for all
subperiods.
Non-euro Euro-periphery Euro-core
Pre-crisis -0.957 -0.742 -0.831
US-crisis -2.037 -2.060 -2.011
Euro-crisis -1.262 -1.903 -1.450
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Table 10: Average returns (%) on days with extreme bottom outcomes, for all subperiods.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pre-crisis
Non-euro -1.341 -1.514 -1.501 -1.694 -2.624
Euro-periphery -1.076 -1.108 -1.128 -1.512 -1.843
Euro-core -1.154 -1.179 -1.141 -1.214 -1.776
US-crisis
Non-euro -2.570 -2.829 -3.222 -3.346 -5.156
Euro-periphery -2.691 -2.978 -2.912 -3.484 -4.238
Euro-core -2.732 -2.709 -2.734 -2.819 -4.236
Euro-crisis
Non-euro -1.606 -1.793 -1.894 -2.565 -2.852
Euro-periphery -2.759 -2.574 -2.718 -2.888 -3.749
Euro-core -1.848 -1.689 -1.759 -2.162 -2.802
Note: Columns one (1) to five (5) correspond to the count of extreme bottom returns. For example,
column one (1) corresponds to one country in the group having an extreme bottom return on this day,
while column five (5) corresponds to all five (5) countries in the group having extreme bottom returns
on the same day.
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Fig. 1. Extreme bottom return counts for all three country groups, for the entire period.
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